Sonya Capri Bangerter v. Ralph Petty; Jarmaccc Properties, LLC; Jarmaccc, Inc; John Does 1-10 : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2008
Sonya Capri Bangerter v. Ralph Petty; Jarmaccc
Properties, LLC; Jarmaccc, Inc; John Does 1-10 :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ralph C. Petty; Attorney for Respondents.
James C. Haskins; Ryan M. James; Attorneys for petitioner.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Sonya Capri Bangerter v. Ralph Petty; Jarmaccc Properties, LLC; Jarmaccc, Inc; John Does 1-10, No. 20080562.00
(Utah Supreme Court, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2821
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SONYA CAPRI BANGERTER, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
RALPH PETTY, an individual; 
JARMACCC PROPERTIES, LLC, a 
Utah limited liability company; 
JARMACCC, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
individuals and entities whose true names 
are unknown, and who may claim some 
right, title, estate, lien or interest in real 
property owned by Plaintiff, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court No. 20080562-SC 
Appellate Court No. 20060511-CA 
District Court No. 040900081 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
On Writ of Certiorari from judgment entered by the 
Utah Court of Appeals in 
BANGERTER v. PETTY, 184 P.3d 1249 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) 
Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Orme 
Ralph C. Petty 
Attorney for Respondent 
10 W. Broadway, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
James C. Haskins (#1406) 
Ryan M.James (#10946) 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-0234 
Fax No: (801)539-5210 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SONYA CAPRI BANGERTER, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
RALPH PETTY, an individual; 
JARMACCC PROPERTIES, LLC, a 
Utah limited liability company; 
JARMACCC, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
individuals and entities whose true names 
are unknown, and who may claim some 
right, title, estate, lien or interest in real 
property owned by Plaintiff, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court No. 20080562-SC 
Appellate Court No. 20060511-CA 
District Court No. 040900081 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
On Writ of Certiorari from judgment entered by the 
Utah Court of Appeals in 
BANGERTER v. PETTY, 184 P.3d 1249 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) 
Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Orme 
Ralph C. Petty 
Attorney for Respondent 
10 W. Broadway, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
James C. Haskins (#1406) 
Ryan M. James (#10946) 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-0234 
Fax No: (801)539-5210 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
QUESTION FOR REVIEW 1 
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 1 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
Nature of the Case & Course of the Proceedings Below 1 





TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page 
Russell !\ich<ir<! I >,T ///, ••' < '•» '•'•',' I OX I> f<! ;' 11 (I Hah 2005) 1 
Bangerter v. Petty, 184 P.3d i_49 i^ Utah Ct. App. 20i '. 5, 7 
Stoker v. Huntington ClevelandIrr. Co., 664 P.2d 118<s s i .:.<>>, . :J*s •. 4 ^ 8 
9 ) 
G///v. 77mm, 720 P.2d 1352, 1353--54 (Utah 1986) 
Goelts v. Continental Bank and Trust Co., 5 Utah 2d 204 (1956) 4 
James v. Galetka, 965 1 ..... • . \( u«h App 1s . 5 
/ " . • - • ' • • • • • - * ' 5 
American Theatre Co. v. Glasmann, 80 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 1938) 5 
Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 53 P.3d 947 (Utah 2002) . . . . 6 
Statutes (Utah) 
UTAH COI)I<, ANN k 7RA"*-l(nO)(iiH?0()8) 1 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c) 1,5, 
Utah R. Civ. P. 9(h) 
Utah R. Civ. P. U{h) 1,6 




The Court of Appeals issued its decision below on May 1, 2008. There has been 
no petition for rehearing. There was an extension of time granted for Petitioner to file this 
Petition on June 2, 2008. Jurisdiction is appropriate with this Court under UTAH CODE 
ANN. §78A-3-102(3)(a) (2008). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding Respondent sufficiently and timely 
presented its statute of limitations defenses? The applicability of a statute of limitations is 
a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Russell Packard Development, Inc. v. 
Carson, 108 P.3d 741, 745 (Utah 2005). Petitioner argued in her Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari that "[t]he Court of Appeals erred in deciding the matter on the basis of a 
statute of limitations defense which was neither plead nor properly before the trial court." 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Rules 8(c), 9(h), 12(h), and 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are 
determinative of this appeal. The text of these Rules are included in the appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND CORE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is a civil case seeking to quiet title of Plaintiff s (hereinafter referred to as 
"Petitioner") primary residence sold at a sheriffs sale for $1,550.00. This quiet title 
action was commenced on January 5, 2004, wherein Petitioner claimed ownership to 
certain real property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Petitioner's Complaint 
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asserted that the property was hers by virtue of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding in 
which the property was vested in her following confirmation of her Chapter 13 Plan, and 
that the property was hers by virtue of her adverse possession of the property. (R. at 1 -
4.)1 The Defendant ("referred to hereinafter as Respondent") answered on February 2, 
2004, denying the material allegations of the Complaint, and asserting affirmative 
defenses based upon waiver and estoppel; failure of consideration; failure to mitigate 
damages; statute of frauds; a general claim that the statute of limitations had run; and a 
denial that Petitioner had any proper title to the property prior to filing for bankruptcy. 
(R. at 11- 14.) The Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment on June 1, 2004. (R. 
at 30 - 113.) Respondent then filed a counter-motion for summary judgment on 
November 2, 2004 (R. at 246) and, subsequently, sought leave to amend its Answer to 
state with specificity its statute of limitations defenses. (R. at 321 - 322; 331 - 338.). 
On February 14, 2005, the Court conducted oral argument on the parties' cross 
motions for summary judgment, and granted Petitioner's motion. (R. at 363; see 
Addendum A.) Following several objections by Respondent to Petitioner's proposed 
Order in the case, the Court entered its own Order on May 4, 2006. In its Order, the 
1
 The District Court docket sheet lists a number of the documents referred to herein as having "no 
date," apparently because the Court's original date stamp is missing from the Record as filed. 
At the time of the filing of the appeal in this case, the District Court was unable to locate its 
original file, and the parties assisted the Court in reconstructing the file and submitting it to the 
Court as the record herein. Throughout her brief herein, the Plaintiff will refer to dates reflected 
on the copies of documents which have now been received as the record, whether or not the 
Court's original date stamp appears thereon. 
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Court rejected Respondent's statute of limitation defense and quieted title to the property 
in favor of Petitioner. (R. at 490 - 492; see Addendum B.) The Respondent filed a 
Notice of Appeal on May 31, 2006. (R. at 494). The matter was argued before the Court 
of Appeals on March 24, 2008. The Court of Appeals issued its opinion on May 1, 2008, 
reversing the trial court's decision and granting summary judgment in favor of 
Respondent. Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on July 2, 2008. The 
Supreme Court granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari on September 17, 2008. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case concerns the ownership of real property, which was sold to Respondent 
at a defective sheriffs sale on March 8, 1996 (R. at 490-491). Petitioner brought this 
action to quiet title to the property on January 5, 2004. (R. at 1-4). Respondent answered 
the complaint averring generally a statute of limitations defense which precluded the 
action. (R. at 11-14). Contemporaneous therewith, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 
on grounds unrelated to a statute of limitations defense. (R. at 18-19). Both Petitioner 
and Respondent then filed cross-motions for summary judgment which were submitted 
for decision on December 2, 2004. (R. at 344-349). 
On December 2, 2004, Respondent submitted a Motion for Leave to Amend 
Answer. (R. at 358-359). Oral arguments on the cross-motions for summary judgment 
were heard on February 14, 2005. (R. at 363). The Court granted Petitioner's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and entered its own Order in the case on May 4, 2006, making certain 
findings, quieting title to the property in favor of Petitioner, and rejecting the 
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Respondents' statute of limitations defense. (R. at 490 - 492). The Respondent filed a 
Notice of Appeal on May 31, 2006. (R. at 494). The matter was argued before the Court 
of Appeals on March 24, 2008. The Court of Appeals issued its opinion on May 1, 2008, 
reversing the trial court's decision and granting summary judgment in favor of 
Respondent. Bangerter v. Petty, 184 P.3d 1249, 1255 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) 
Respondent only cited statutes for its statute of limitations defense in its Rule 56(f) 
Motion for Order of Continuance to Conduct Discovery, Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Motion for Leave to Amend Answer. 
Id. at 1253. Respondent's Motion for Leave to Amend Answer was not granted by the 
trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING RESPONDENT 
SUFFICIENTLY AND TIMELY PRESENTED ITS STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS DEFENSES. 
A. The statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense, which can 
be, and in this case, was waived. 
A defendant in a civil suit can and will waive its statute of limitations defenses if it 
fails to raise them affirmatively in a responsive pleading or a motion to dismiss, unless an 
amended pleading asserting the defense is allowed pursuant to the requirements of Rule 
15(a). Stakerv. Huntington ClevelandIrr. Co., 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983); Gill v. 
Timm, 720 P.2d 1352, 1353-54 (Utah 1986) ("[affirmative defenses must be set forth in 
responsive pleadings and are usually waived if not so pleaded."); Goelts v. Continental 
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Bank and Trust Co., 299 P.2d 832 (Utah 1956); James v. Galetha, 965 P.2d 567, 571 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("In civil cases, a statute of limitations must be pleaded as an 
affirmative defense, or it is waived."); American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 4 
(Utah 1984). The section of the applicable statute must be specifically pleaded and if the 
section pleaded is not applicable, it does not avail defendant that the action may be barred 
by another section not pleaded. American Theatre Co. v. Glasmann, 80 P.2d 922, 923 
(Utah 1938). 
In its decision, the Court of Appeals enumerates four ways in which the defendant 
raised an appropriate statute of limitations defense, and in each it errs. Bangerter v. Petty, 
184 P.3d 1249, 1253 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). A defendant may only raise the statute of 
limitations defense in one of three ways: in a responsive pleading in accordance with Rule 
9(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; in a motion to dismiss; or in an amended 
pleading pursuant to the requirements of Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Stoker v. Huntington ClevelandIrr. Co., 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983). 
Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures states in part that "[i]n pleading to 
a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively .. .statute of limitations.. .and 
any other matter constituting an affirmative defense. Utah R. Civ. P 8(c) (2004). Rule 
9(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifies and provides: 
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not 
necessary to state the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged 
generally that the cause of action is barred by the provisions of the statute 
relied on, referring to or describing such statute specifically and definitely 
by section number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designating 
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the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation 
is controverted, the party pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the 
facts showing that the cause of action is so barred. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 9(h) (2004) (emphasis added). Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure states in part that "[a] party waives all defenses and objections not presented 
either by motion or by answer or reply." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h) (2004). 
This Court has long held that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require the statute 
of limitations defense to be sufficiently and timely presented or it is waived. As recent as 
2002, this Court reiterated this rule when it stated that "affirmative defenses should be set 
forth in responsive pleadings" and in some cases "a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) 
may raise affirmative defenses." Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 53 P.3d 
9475 949-950 (Utah 2002). 
In this case, the Court of Appeals looks beyond the Respondent's responsive 
pleading and motion to dismiss in extrapolating a statute of limitations defense, and errs 
in doing so. The Respondent failed to plead a statute of limitations defense as required by 
the rules, but instead states in his responsive pleading, "Plaintiffs claim against 
Respondents is barred under the doctrine of statute of limitations."(R. at 13). 
The defendant failed to raise the defense appropriately because he failed to refer to 
or describe, "such statute specifically and definitely by section number, subsection 
designation, if any, " or at the very least failed to designate, "the provision relied upon 
sufficiently clearly to identify it." Utah R. Civ. P. 9(h). The Respondent did file a 
motion to dismiss, but the motion did not seek dismissal of the case, but instead, dismissal 
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of a party, and did not raise any affirmative defenses. (R. at 18-19). Based on the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's precedent, Respondent's general language in its 
Answer alleging a statute of limitations defense is insufficient to preserve the defense, 
and therefore is waived. 
B. Neither the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure nor the controlling 
precedent of this Court, allows the Court of Appeals to conclude the 
statute of limitations defense was sufficiently and timely plead by the 
Respondent. 
The Court of Appeals erroneously cites the following four ways the Respondent 
plead the statute of limitations defense, each of which depart from the rules of civil 
procedure and this Court's rule of law: 1) raising the statute of limitations generally in the 
answer; 2) by motion for order of continuance to conduct discovery, and related 
memorandum in support, dated November 23, 2004; 3) by reply memorandum in support 
of Respondent's motion for summary judgment, dated November 23, 2004; and 4) by 
amended answer. Bangerter v. Petty, 184 P.3d 1249, 1253 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). 
Respondent presented different, and inconsistent statutes of limitations - in the 
Answer Respondent raised a general statute of limitations defense without citing to a 
specific code section (R. 11-14); in its Motion and Memorandum for Order of 
Continuance to Conduct Discovery it raised §78-12-28 and §78-12-26 (R. at 127); in its 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment it raised 
§78-12-25(3); and in its Motion to Amend Answer it raised §78-12-25(3) as a sole and 
singular statute of limitations defense. (R. at 337). The manner in which Respondent 
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raised these defenses was inconsistent with the rules of civil procedure and the precedent 
set by this Court, In all cases, the Respondent failed to raise an appropriate statute of 
limitations defense. The Court of Appeals erred m finding Respondent Milliciuitls and 
timely plead an applicable stall ite of limitations defense. 
C. The Respondent was not granted leave to amend its Answer, and 
therefore did not present a sufficient and timely statute of limitations 
defense. 
This court in Staker v Huntington ( Icw/tintl h ,J ' \ • .ils«"» ii«Hi il llul a sfalulf " il 
1^  iroperly raised in an answer or motion to dismiss is waived 
unless an amended pleading asserting the defense is allowed pursuant to the requirements 
of Rule 15(a). 644 P.2d 11 ^ 1190 (Utah 1983). Utah Rule of , Procedure i ^ 
pro\ 
t • \. '••. d responsive pleading is served.../ o] titer wise a party may amend his 
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party, Utah R. Civ. 
P. 15(a) (emphasis added). 
In i'cg.! ' ' -i'//. r v. 
Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co., stated that "[a] trial court's refusal to grant leave to amend 
is not reversible error unless the denial constitutes an abuse of discretion/' and that "[a]s a 
general proposition, we \ ill mil U'VUM: a dial i uml \ denial ol'a inolion (u anicinl , lo 
. . , -iense." 644 P. 2d 1188, 1190. This Court placed 
special emphasis on the following relevant facts from Staker. 
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Plaintiff, in going to the expense of discovery and preparing for trial, relied on 
defendant's answer filed over two years prior to trial. Plaintiff pleaded his case 
and responded to discovery with specificity, setting forth all relevant facts, 
events, and dates. The essential facts upon which the statute could have been 
asserted were known to the defendant from the beginning. Defendant alleges 
no surprise, discovery of new evidence relating to the defense, or other 
justification for its delay in asserting the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs case 
was not subject to the evidentiary difficulties that statutes of limitation are 
designed to prevent, such as lost evidence, faded memories, and absent 
witnesses. If a case is truly stale, a motion to amend an answer to assert the 
statute of limitations may be granted. In the instant case, however, nearly all 
the essential evidence was available and preserved in documentary form, and 
the important participants in the transactions at issue were available to testify 
at trial. To have permitted an amendment under those circumstances would 
have only made pointless and wasteful the time and expense that had been 
expended in preparing the case for trial. 
Id. Ultimately, this Court in Staker affirmed the Court of Appeals decision denying the 
statute of limitations defense and upheld the denial of the motion to amend the answer. 
Id. at 1191. 
Respondent's Motion for Leave to Amend Answer in this case was not granted by 
the Trial Court. There are several facts in this case which are similar to the facts in 
Staker. First, Petitioner filed her Complaint, which plead with particularity all necessary 
dates, and events, on January 5, 2004. (R. at 1-4). Respondent filed its Answer 
contemporaneous with its Motion to Dismiss on February 2, 2004.(R. at 11-21). The 
Petitioner relied on Respondent's Answer and has spent a lot of time and gone to great 
expense in pursuing this case. Second, all of the essential facts upon which the statute 
could have been asserted were known to the defendant from the beginning because the 
Petitioner pleaded her case with specificity, setting forth all relevant facts, events, and 
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dates, (iv. cu 1—v). ihird, Respondent alleges no surprise, discovery of new evidence 
relating to the defense, or other justification for its delay in asserting the statute of 
limitations defense. Fourth, Petitioner's case is not subject to the evidentiary difficulties 
and absent witnesses. The instant case concerns real property transactions and court 
records, all the essential evidence was available and preserved in documentary form, and 
the important participants in the transactions at issue were a\ ailable (o Icsti ly. 
Ill tl lis case. ji ist as ii :i Stt ikei to ha vre permitted an amended answer under the 
circumstances described above would have only made pointless and wasteful the time and 
expense expended by Petitioner. The Respondent was not granted leave to amend its 
answer, and as a result, there \ vere i 1.0 statute of lin litations defenses sufficiently and 
tim dy plead in the matter. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN OVERRULING THE TRIAL 
COURT ON THE BASIS OF A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE 
WHICH WAS NOT PROPERLY PLEAD BY THE RESPONDENT. 
waived all such defenses. The trial court specifically found, "The defendants' arguments 
concerning the statute of limitations and whether the plaintiff was required to bring her 
defective deed action against the Sheriff of Salt I ,ake Com it> are denied "'" (1R at 1 91). 
The ti lal ecu u t was ji istified ii 1 denyii ig si ich argi lment becai ise the R espondent waived its 
statute of limitations defense according to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and this 
Court's controlling precedent. 
As stated above, this Court has well established precedent that affirmative 
defenses, particularly a statute of limitations defense, must be plead with particularity in 
the responsive pleading or motion to dismiss or it will be waived. This general rule has 
been set aside by the Court of Appeals' decision, which undermines consistent and 
lengthy case history. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals erred in holding Respondent sufficiently and timely 
presented its statute of limitations defenses, because the Respondent failed to 
appropriately raise them and in so doing, waived them. The Court of Appeals decision 
ignores the precedent established by this Court and uproots the well established pleading 
requirements of affirmative defenses in the State of Utah. This Court should follow 
precedent and overturn the Court of Appeals decision and affirm the Trial Court's 
decision. 
DATED this 12th day of November, 20Q8. \
 : : : ^ 
RVkn Mi<Famejs 
/ Attoj^ey for/Appellee and petitioner 
Jerries C. Haskins / ^ 
^Attorney for Plaintiff, Appellee and Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the | ^j 'clay of November, 2008,1 caused to be served by 
HAND DELIVERY two true and correct copies of the foregoing Petitioner's Brief, as 
follows: 
Ralph Petty 
10 W. Broadway, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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APPENDIX 
A. OPINION dated May 1, 2008 by the Honorable Judith M. Billings, Court of 
Appeals of Utah, reversing the district Court's grant of summary judgment in favor 
of Plaintiff and directing the trial court to grant summary judgment in Defendant's 
favor. 
B. ORDER entered May 4, 2006, by the Honorable Mark S. Kouris. 
C. Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (2004). 
D. Rule 9(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (2004). 
E. Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (2004). 
F. Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (2004). 
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184 P.3d 1249; BANGERTER v. PETTY; 2008 UT App 153 
BANGERTER v. PETTY 
184 P.3d 1249 (UT 2008) 
2008 UT App 153 
Sonya Capri BANGERTER, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Ralph PETTY, an individual; Jarmaccc Properties, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; Jarmaccc, 
Inc., a Utah corporation; and John Does 1 through 10, individuals and entities whose true names are 
unknown, and who may claim some right, title, estate, lien, or interest in real property owned by 
Plaintiff, Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 20060511-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 1,2008 
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, Mark S. Kouris and Stephen L. Roth, JJ. 
, _ _ _ _ ^ ^ Page 1250 —«~««^^ 
Ralph C. Petty, Salt Lake City, for Appellants. 
James C. Haskins and Thomas N. Thompson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before GREENWOOD, P.J., BILLINGS, and ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
\ 1 Defendants Ralph Petty, Jarmaccc Properties, LLC, and Jarmaccc, Inc. (collectively Jarmaccc) 
appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff Sonya Capri Bangerter. 
Specifically. Jarmaccc argues that the trial court erred in determining that a sheriffs sale of Ms. 
Bangerter's house (the Property) is void because the sheriffs sale included an incorrect legal description 
or is estopped under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. We reverse and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
BACKGROUND 
\ 2 Ms. Bangerter and her former husband Roger Scott Bangerter(fnl) purchased the Property in 
April 1994. Ms. Bangerter had an outstanding bill owed to her dentist, which was turned over to the 
North American Recovery Services collection agency (N.A.R.). On April 25, 1995, a judgment was 
entered against the Bangerters in the amount of $307.46. On August 14, 1995, a trial judge signed a writ 
of execution commanding the sheriff "to collect the judgment, with costs, interest, and fees, and to sell 
enough of defendant's non-exempt real property to satisfy the same." 
\ 3 On December 21, 1995, a deputy sheriff filed a notice of real estate levy against the Property. 
The notice stated: 
Notice is hereby given, that under and by virtue of a Writ of Execution, issued out of the 
Circuit Court of the State of Utah, of which the annexed is a true copy, I have this day 
attached and levied upon all right, title, claim and interest of defendant(s), of, in and to the 
following described Real Estate, standing on the records of Salt Lake County, in the name 
of defendant, [] Bangerter, and particularly described as follows: BEG 67 FT E & 69 FT N 
OF SW COR LOT 68, GLENDALE PARK SUB, PLAT A; N 60 FT; E 120 FT TO BEG. 
0.19 AC. 
Page 1251 
f 4 On March 8, 1996, the deputy sheriff signed a real estate certificate of sale execution against the 
Property, which was filed for record with the county recorder's office on March 28, 1996. The real estate 
certificate of sale identified the parties, case number, and the dates of the judgment rendered, execution 
issued, and sale of the Property. It also stated, in relevant part: 
I hereby certify that under an Execution issued out of the Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, in an action pending in said Court in the above named suit, I was commanded 
to take the sum of $263.56, with interest, costs and Sheriffs fees, amounting in all to the 
sum of $958.02, to satisfy the judgment in said action by selling the unexempted real 
property of the said defendant. I have levied upon, and . . . after due and legal notice I sold 
at public auction, according to law, the real property to Jarmac[cc] L.L.C., for the sum of 
$1,550.00, which was the highest bid made for all the right, title, claim and interest of said 
defendants.... I further certify that said property is subject to redemption in lawful money 
of the United States of America, pursuant to the statute in such cases made and provided. 
This document also included the same property description listed in the notice of levy. 
f 5 The rules of civil procedure that were in effect at the time required the sheriff to 
serve upon the judgment debtor, in the same manner as service of a summons in a civil 
action, or cause to be transmitted by both regular and certified mail, returned receipt 
requested, to the judgment debtor's last known address as provided by the judgment 
creditor, (i) the notice of execution and exemptions and right to a hearing, and (ii) the 
application by which the judgment debtor may request a hearing. Upon service of the writ, 
the sheriff or constable may also set the date of sale or delivery and serve upon the 
judgment debtor notice of the date and time of sale or delivery in the same manner as 
service of the notice of execution and exemptions and right to a hearing. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 69(g) (2004). 
16 On September 16, 1996, a sheriffs deed was signed by the sheriff and N.A.R., explaining that the 
sheriff had sold the Property according to law to N.A.R. for $1550 and that no redemption had been 
made. On November 12, 1996, Petty filed a request for notice concerning the Property, requesting 
notices of default or sale. On November 16, 1996, the sheriffs deed was recorded, noting (1) certain 
legal property was sold at a sheriffs sale on March 5, 1996, to N.A.R. for $1550, (2) more than six 
months had elapsed without any redemption of the property, and (3) the property was sold. The sheriffs 
deed conveyed the property to N.A.R. It also included the same property description as mentioned 
above. 
f 7 On January 5, 1998, the sheriff filed an amended real estate certificate of sale execution. The 
amended certificate of sale execution identified the property as: 
Beginning at a point 670 feet East and 69 feet North of the Southwest corner of Lot 68, 
GLENDALE PARK SUBDIVISION, PLAT "A", Salt Lake City, Utah, being in the 
Southwest quarter of Section 11, Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and running thence North 69 feet; thence East 120 feet; thence South 69 feet; 
thence West 120 feet to the point of beginning. SIDWELL# 15-11-331-010. 
f 8 On January 20, 1998, N.A.R. filed a quitclaim deed in favor of Jarmaccc Properties, LLC, 
regarding the Property. On March 10, 1998, Bangerter filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. On May 
14, 1998, Jarmaccc served Bangerter with a notice to quit, instructing her to vacate the Property, but this 
could not be pursued because of her pending bankruptcy action. 
19 On April 23,1999, Bangerter filed a second petition in bankruptcy. As part of her Chapter 13 
plan, Bangerter listed Jarmaccc as a secured creditor and scheduled $1200 to be paid to Jarmaccc. 
Jarmaccc received a copy of Bangerter's bankruptcy plan but did not object. Bangerter paid Jarmaccc the 
full amount set out by the bankruptcy plan. The bankruptcy was dismissed on August 26, 2003 because 
of Bangerter's 
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failure to make payments, and no discharge was granted. 
f 10 On January 6, 2004, Bangerter filed this action against Jarmaccc, seeking quiet title to the 
Property. On July 2, 2004, Bangerter filed a third Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. During the pendency 
of the bankruptcy action, both parties filed motions for summary judgment to resolve the case. The court 
ruled in Bangerter's favor on May 4, 2006. 
If 11 The trial court found: 
1. The original sale of [Bangerter's] property contained an incorrect legal description and 
thus created a defective title which failed to convey any title to [Jarmaccc] or any other 
person or entity; 
2. Jarmaccc Properties, L.L.C., was on notice of [Bangerter's] bankruptcy filing; 
3. Jarmaccc Properties, L.L.C., received a copy of and failed to object to [Bangerter's] 
proposed Chapter 13 plan; 
4. [Bangerter] paid [Jarmaccc] the full amount set out by the bankruptcy plan; 
5. [Bangerter] will be injured if [Jarmaccc] is allowed to contradict its actions in accepting 
the payments made pursuant to the Chapter 13 plan; 
7. [Jarmaccc's] arguments concerning the statute of limitations and whether [Bangerter] was 
required to bring her defective deed action against the Sheriff of Salt Lake County are 
denied. 
The trial court then quieted title in Bangerter and extinguished any claim by Jarmaccc to the 
Property. This appeal followed. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f 12 Jarmaccc argues that the trial court erred in concluding no statute of limitations barred 
Bangerter's action and granting summary judgment in favor of Bangerter. "Summary judgment is 
appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Because summary judgment presents only questions of law, we give no 
deference to the district court's legal decisions and review them for correctness.'1 Fericks v. Lucy Ann 
Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, \ 10, 100 P.3d 1200 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)).(fh2) 
ANALYSIS 
Tf 13 Jarmaccc argues that Bangerter's suit is barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations. 
Jarmaccc asserts that the tolling date for the statute of limitations is January 20, 1998, the day N.A.R. 
conveyed the Property to Jarmaccc, or at the very latest, March 10,1998, when Bangerter filed her first 
petition for bankruptcy. Jarmaccc contends that Bangerter "knew of Jarmaccc before that date. 
Bangerter did nothing to attack either the sheriffs sale or Jarmaccc's ownership of the Property until she 
filed this action on January 6, 2004, almost six years later.(fn3) 
\ 14 On appeal, Jarmaccc offers three possible statutes of limitations which might bar Bangerter's 
action: Utah Code section 78-12-28(1), see Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28(1) (2002) ("[a]n action may be 
brought within two years against a . . . sheriff... for liability incurred by the doing of an act in his 
official capacity"), Utah Code section 78-12-26(3), see id. § 78-12-26(3) (2002) ("[a]n action may be 
brought within three years . . . for relief on the ground of . . . mistake"), or the general statute of 
limitations, Utah Code section 78-12-25(3), see id. § 78-12-25(3) (2002) ("[a]n action may be brought 
within 
_ _ ™ _ ^ P a g e 1253 —«—~™^ 
four years . . . for relief not otherwise provided for by law."). We need not analyze which of the three 
statutes of limitations is relevant as all of them expired before Bangerter brought her suit. 
I. Was the Affirmative Defense of Statute of Limitations Properly Pleaded? 
f 15 Bangerter argues that the statute of limitations cannot bar her lawsuit because it was not 
specifically pleaded and proved at trial. Rule 9(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandates: 
In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to state the facts showing the 
defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is barred by the provisions 
of the statute relied on, referring to or describing such statute specifically and definitely by 
section number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designating the provision 
relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation is controverted, the party 
pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing that the cause of action is 
so barred. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 9(h) (emphasis added). 
f 16 In its first answer, Jarmaccc raised the statute of limitations by stating simply that "Plaintiffs 
claim against Defendants is barred under the doctrine of statute of limitations." However, our review of 
the record shows that in Jarmaccc's Rule 56(f) Motion for Order of Continuance to Conduct Discovery, 
dated June 15, 2004, and the accompanying memorandum in support, Jarmaccc quite clearly laid out its 
arguments concerning the various statutes of limitations. It offered both Utah Code section 78-12-26 and 
Utah Code section 78-12-28 as possible statutes of limitations that would bar Bangerter's claim. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-26, -28. Jarmaccc again explained its argument in its Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated November 23, 2004, and filed an 
amended answer which included Utah Code section 78-12-25(3), the general statute of limitations. 
Furthermore, the trial court considered and ruled upon these arguments. 
f 17 Bangerter argues that Conder v. Hunt, 2000 UT App 105, 1 P.3d 558, prevents Jarmaccc from 
relying on its statute of limitations argument. In Conder, the defendants specifically pleaded two statutes 
of limitation, one for written contracts, and one for fraud. See id. f 13. However, in their motions for 
summary judgment, the defendants argued only the statute applicable to fraud actions. See id. This court 
rejected the defendants' argument on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not actually alleged fraud in their 
complaint, but rather styled their complaint as one to quiet title. See id. ^ 14. We concluded that because 
the defendants had not shown that their chosen statute of limitations applied, we would not consider 
other statutes of limitation that might have applied. See id. ^[ 14,17. We find this case distinguishable 
from the one before us. 
f 18 Bangerter and the trial court clearly had written notice of the three statutes of limitations at 
issue from documents filed with the court, including an amended answer. In fact, the trial court ruled on 
the issue. Moreover, which statute of limitations is applicable is irrelevant because all of the statutes 
Jarmaccc pleaded had passed before Bangerter brought her lawsuit. 
II. Quiet Title Action—No Statute of Limitations 
f^ 19 The trial court may have determined that the statute of limitations arguments were without 
merit because, in Utah, no statute of limitations applies to a ,fsuit[] brought to quiet the title to real 
property;' See In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, \ 26, 144 P.3d 1129. 
120 In In re Hoopiiaina Trust, id., the Utah Supreme Court clarified the rule on statutes of 
limitations concerning actions to quiet title. We quote liberally: 
[I]t is clear that all actions, whether legal or equitable, are subject to a statute of limitations 
in Utah. However, suits brought to quiet the title to real property have always been an 
exception to this rule. A true quiet title action is a suit brought "to quiet an existing title 
against an adverse 
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or hostile claim of another," and "the effect of a decree quieting title is not to vest title but 
rather is to perfect an existing title as against other claimants." Thus, the question becomes 
whether a claim is a true quiet title action or whether the claimant really seeks other relief; 
if the claim is a true quiet title action, it is not subject to a statute of limitations. Courts 
must proceed cautiously when applying this rule, however, for parties should not be able to 
avoid the statute of limitations on other claims by simply disguising them as claims for 
quiet title relief. 
. . . [A] court must examine the relief sought in order to determine whether the statute of 
limitations applies. When a party asserts a quiet title claim in which that party merely 
requests that the court adjudicate the validity of an opponent's adverse or hostile claim to 
property to which the party already holds title, no statute of limitations applies. In other 
words, if it is not necessary that the court grant other relief in favor of the party, such as 
cancelling a deed on the basis of fraud, in order to rule on the quiet title claim, then the 
statute of limitations cannot operate as a bar to the party's quiet title claim. Thus, in order to 
determine whether the statute of limitations applies to a quiet title claim, the court must 
assess on what basis the party would be entitled to have title quieted. If the party is entitled 
to have title quieted only if the court first finds in his or her favor on another legal issue, 
then the same statute of limitations that applies to that legal issue will also apply to the 
quiet title claim. Similarly, a party may seek to quiet title to real property in addition to 
requesting other relief in the same action. Despite the fact that no statute of limitations 
applies to a true quiet title claim, the respective statutes of limitation applicable to the 
party's other claims for relief may operate to bar those claims. Ifthepartyrs claim for quiet 
title relief can be granted only if the party succeeds on another claim, then the statute of 
limitations applicable to the other claim will also apply to the quiet title claim. 
Id. %% 26-27 (last three emphases added) (citations omitted). 
% 21 We must evaluate, then, whether Bangerter's action is a "true" quiet title claim. We conclude 
that it is not. Bangerter's suit against Jarmaccc is necessarily predicated on a challenge to the validity of 
the sheriffs sale and the title deed which was a result of that sale. Without that underlying challenge, she 
has no claim against Jarmaccc, who rightfully received the Property from N.A.R., who fairly purchased 
it at a sheriffs sale. In fact, without first challenging the sheriffs sale, Bangerter does not have title to 
the Property and cannot quiet it. Thus, Bangerter can only succeed on an action to quiet her title to the 
Property if the court first invalidates the sheriffs sale. Bangerter's action here is thus not a "true" action 
to quiet title, and, under Hoopiiaina, some statute of limitations applies. See id. As previously noted, it is 
irrelevant which statute of limitations applies, because they all passed prior to Bangerter's initiation of 
this lawsuit. 
TJ 22 Bangerter attempts to distinguish Hoopiiaina from this case. She argues that Hoopiiaina did not 
deal with a situation where someone was in "actual and continuous possession of the property." She 
relies on Conder v. Hunt, 2000 UT App 105, 1 P.3d 558, which was decided before Hoopiiaina and in 
dicta "recognize[d] the general rule . . . that those in actual possession of real estate are never barred by 
any statute of limitation from seeking to quiet their title." Id. \ 17. In Conder, we noted that "[w]hile no 
Utah case cited by the parties specifically adopts this rule, a number of cases seem to assume that Utah 
adheres to it." Id. We specifically stated that "a definitive ruling on the question must await a case in 
which it is more squarely in issue." Id. 
^ 23 We conclude Conder and Hoopiiaina are consistent. A person in possession who seeks to quiet 
their own title is not barred by any statute of limitations. In this case, Bangerter no longer had the title to 
the Property. Thus, Bangerter is not pursuing a "true" quiet title action because she did not have 
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the title to the Property at the time she was in possession of the Property and brought her lawsuit. She 
therefore is not free from the constraints of a statute of limitations. Accordingly, we conclude that the 
statute of limitations bars her suit. 
1f 24 We reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in Bangerter's favor, and direct the trial 
court to grant summary judgment in Jarmaccc's favor because Bangerter's lawsuit is barred by the statute 
of limitations. 
125 I CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge. 
1f 26 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: GREGORY K. ORME, Judge. 
Footnotes: 
FN1. The Bangerters divorced in April 2000. Sonya Bangerter was awarded the Property as part of 
the divorce settlement. Although her husband's name appears on the writ of execution, no party has 
mentioned him as part of this lawsuit. 
FN2. Jarmaccc raises additional issues on appeal. However, because we conclude that the trial court 
did not err in concluding no statute of limitations barred Bangerter's action, we do not address the other 
issues raised on appeal. 
FN3. In a signed affidavit dated June 1,2004, Bangerter states "I never received any notice from any 
person that my home would be sold to any party as the result of the debt for dental services." This 
statement is in conflict with the sheriffs sworn statements in the certificate of sale that he complied with 
the notice requirements. However, this factual question is ultimately immaterial because we conclude all 
the potentially applicable statutes of limitations expired before she brought her actions to void the title 
received pursuant to the sheriffs sale. Further, she does not deny receiving the May 14, 1998 Notice to 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SONIA CAPRI BANGERTER, : ORDER 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 040900081 
vs. : 
RALPH PETTY, an individual, et al. , : Judge Mark S. Kouris 
Defendants. : 
Before this Court is the defendants' Objection to the proposed Order 
granting the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, the defendants' 
Motion for Restitution, and other miscellaneous matters. This Court 
heard the Motion for Summary Judgment on February 14, 2005, with Thomas 
N. Thompson of Haskins & Associates, L.L.C., representing the plaintiff, 
and Ralph Petty, of counsel with Berrett & Assoc., L.C., representing the 
defendants. The Court granted the plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The defendant then filed an Objection to the proposed Order 
and a Motion for Restitution. The Court conducted a second hearing on 
April 18, 2005. Both attorneys were present. The Court finds the 
following: 
1. The original sale of the plaintiff's property contained an 
incorrect legal description and thus created a defective title 
/ \ r>^T) 
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which failed to convey any title to the defendant or any other 
person or entity; 
2. Jarmaccc Properties, L.L.C., was on notice of the plaintiff's 
bankruptcy filing; 
3. Jarmaccc Properties, L.L.C., received a copy of and failed to 
object to the plaintiff's proposed Chapter 13 plan; 
4. The plaintiff paid the defendant the full amount set out by 
the bankruptcy plan; 
5. The plaintiff will be injured if the defendant is allowed to 
contradict its actions in accepting the payments made pursuant 
to the Chapter 13 plan; 
-6 JarmaGG-~LnG^ —and-Mr-.- -Ralph -Pet-ty -have— di-SGlaimed-an-y-i-n-tsoiest-
in any property in this action, and the Court therefore finds 
that they have no claim or interest in the plaintiff's 
property; 
7. The defendants' arguments concerning the statute of 
limitations and whether the plaintiff was required to bring 
her defective deed action against the Sheriff of Salt Lake 
County are denied. 
This Court then hereby orders that the title to the real property 
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in dispute in this case, known as 1145 South 1100 West, City of Salt Lake 
City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, and more particularly described 
as : 
Beginning at a point 670 feet East and 69 feet North of the 
Southwest corner of Lot 68, GLENDALE PARK SUBDIVISION, PLAT 
"A", Salt Lake City, Utah, being in the Southwest quarter of 
Section 11, Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and running thence North 69 feet; thence East 120 
feet; thence South 69 feet; thence West 120 feet to the point 
of beginning. SIDWELL #15-11-1331-010. 
is hereby quieted in the plaintiff and any claim in and to the real 
property by the defendants herein, or any of them, is hereby disallowed 
and extinguished. 
It is further ordered that the defendants' Motion for Restitution 
-is-denied-. • 
Dated this _day of May, 2006. 
\RK S. KOURIS 
)ISTRICT COURT 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order, to the following, t h i s ^ ^ ^ d a v of May, 2006: 
James C. Haskins 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ralph C. Petty 
Attorney for Defendant 
50 S. Main Street, Suite 530 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 




RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Part III Pleadings, Motions, and Orders 
Rule 8 General rules of pleadings. 
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he 
deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim 
asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and 
this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the averments denied. When a 
pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so 
much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good 
faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make his denials as specific 
denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such 
designated averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend to controvert all 
its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively 
accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in 
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, 
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other 
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a 
defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall 
treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, 
other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. 
Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as 
denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading 
or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, 
either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made 
in the alternative and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made 
insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. A party may also state as 
many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on 
equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 
11. 
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. 
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(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to state the facts 
showing the defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is barred by the provisions 
of the statute relied on, referring to or describing such statute specifically and definitely by section 
number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designating the provision relied upon sufficiently 
clearly to identify it. If such allegation is controverted, the party pleading the statute must establish, on 
the trial, the facts showing that the cause of action is so barred. 
(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state, or an ordinance of any 
political subdivision thereof, or a right derived from such statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to 
such statute or ordinance by its title and the day of its passage or by its section number or other 
designation in any official publication of the statutes or ordinances. The court shall thereupon take 
judicial notice thereof. 
(j) Libel and slander. 
(j)(l) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary in an action for libel or slander to set forth any 
intrinsic facts showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter out of which the action 
arose; but it is sufficient to state generally that the same was published or spoken concerning the 
plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party alleging such defamatory matter must establish, on 
the trial, that it was so published or spoken. 
(j)(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander, the defendant may allege both 
the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of 
damages, and, whether he proves the justification or not, he may give in evidence the mitigating 
circumstances. 
(k) Renew judgment. A complaint alleging failure to pay a judgment shall describe the judgment 
with particularity or attach a copy of the judgment to the complaint. 
(1) Allocation of fault. 
(1)(1) A party seeking to allocate fault to a non-party under Title 78, Chapter 27 shall file: 
(1)(1)(A) a description of the factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated; and 
(1)(1)(B) information known or reasonably available to the party identifying the non-party, including 
name, address, telephone number and employer. If the identity of the non-party is unknown, the party 
shall so state. 
(1)(2) The information specified in subsection (1)(1) must be included in the party's responsive 
pleading if then known or must be included in a supplemental notice filed within a reasonable time after 
the party discovers the factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated but no later than the 
deadline specified in the discovery plan under Rule 26(f). The court, upon motion and for good cause 
shown, may permit a party to file the information specified in subsection (1)(1) after the expiration of 
any period permitted by this rule, but in no event later than 90 days before trial. 
(1)(3) A party may not seek to allocate fault to another except by compliance with this rule. 
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RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Part III Pleadings, Motions, and Orders 
Rule 9 Pleading special matters. 
Rule 9. Pleading special matters. 
(a)(1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of 
a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of 
persons that is made a party. A party may raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the 
capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative 
capacity by specific negative averment, which shall include facts within the pleader's knowledge. If 
raised as an issue, the party relying on such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall establish the 
same on the trial. 
(a)(2) Designation of unknown defendant. When a party does not know the name of an adverse 
party, he may state that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse party may be designated in any 
pleading or proceeding by any name; provided, that when the true name of such adverse party is 
ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly. 
(a)(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of unknown parties. In an action to quiet title 
wherein any of the parties are designated in the caption as "unknown," the pleadings may describe such 
unknown persons as "all other persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or interest in, or lien 
upon the real property described in the pleading adverse to the complainant's ownership, or clouding his 
title thereto." 
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other 
condition of mind of a person may be averred generally. 
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent, it is 
sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred. A denial 
of performance or occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity, and when so made the 
party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on the trial establish the facts showing such 
performance or occurrence. 
(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or act it is sufficient to aver that the 
document was issued or the act done in compliance with law. 
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi 
judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decision without setting 
forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it. A denial of jurisdiction shall be made specifically and with 
particularity and when so made the party pleading the judgment or decision shall establish on the trial all 
controverted jurisdictional facts. 
(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, averments of time and 
place are material and shall be considered like all other averments of material matter. 
(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically stated. 
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RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Part III Pleadings, Motions, and Orders 
Rule 12 Defenses and objections. 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a defendant shall 
serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete within 
the state and within thirty days after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. 
A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within twenty days 
after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days 
after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the 
order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of 
time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer than 
all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be served 
within ten days after the service of the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading 
thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) 
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any 
of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or 
objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive 
pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets 
forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the 
adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion 
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all 
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by 
Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not 
to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion 
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties 
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, 
whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of 
this rule shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders 
u& 
that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is 
so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the 
party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion 
shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of 
the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court 
may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it 
deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no 
responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty days after 
the service of the pleading, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or 
any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it the other 
motions herein provided for and then available. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not 
include therein all defenses and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, 
the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, 
except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or 
by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal 
defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment 
on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of 
the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the 
action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in 
the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of any 
motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this 
state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish 
security for costs and charges which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and 
determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a 
$300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs and charges as may be 
awarded against such plaintiff No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of 
the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered within 
30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order 
dismissing the action. 
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RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Part III Pleadings, Motions, and Orders 
Rule 15 Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a 
responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and 
the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent 
of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in 
response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the 
court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by 
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in 
the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after 
judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is 
objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would 
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, 
if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading 
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original 
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon 
such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or 
occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. 
Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for 
relief or defense. If the court deems it advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental 
pleading, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor. 
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